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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Appellant Cindy L. Thompson, formerly Cindy L. Young, hereinafter referred to as "Young"
or "Appellant/5 respectfully petitions the Court for rehearing of her appeal in this matter Thompson
does so on the basis that the Court has overlooked or misconstrued some material facts that are
disputed and preclude summary judgment entered by the trial court. Young further states that this
Honorable Court's construction of the Broker-Sales Executive Contract - Independent Contractor
Agreement (employment contract) between her and Wardley Corporation, dba Wardley Better Homes
and Gardens, hereinafter referred to as "Wardley/' rewrites the contract and creates a new provision
which this Court has in prior cases declined to do. Further, it makes the contract a conditional contract,
conditioned on circumstances other than the performance of Young, which was not specified by
Wardley in the contract and not contemplated by Young when entering into the contract on April 30th
1992, nor at any time thereafter while the contract was in full force and effect.
COURTS RECITATION AND ANALYSIS OF FACTS
1.

The Court states in paragraph 6 of its opinion that "Young received her share of the

$150,000.00 commission Wardley collected at the closing". However, in a footnote to the paragraph,
the Court notes that Young amended her complaint and raised claims that Wardley failed to pay her
all of her share of the commission... She received a jury verdict and judgment in favor on that claim."

These two statements of relevant facts are incongruous. Young, in her affidavit filed in opposition to
Wardley's motion for summary judgment, denied that she was paid her share of the $150,000.00
commission. (Appeal Record (AR), pp. 305 & 314) This appeal, taken initially by Wardley, witnesses
that Young has not yet been paid her share of the $150,000 commission collected at closing.
2. The Court states in paragraph 4 of its Opinion, "Young, on behalf of Wardley, objected
to the commission reduction, but did not take any other action to prevent the escrow agent from paying
one-half of the unpaid commission to the seller and one-half to the buyer.1 "However, in paragraph 19
of its Opinion, the Court states that Young "asked the escrow officer not to record the transaction
until after Wardley received its full four-percent commission". The second statement is true and
contradicts the Court's statement of fact in paragraph 4. Counsel for the appellant, in responding to
questions during oral argument, informed the Court that Young in and of herself could not do anything
more. Under Utah law, Young did not have the authority to bring an interpleader action. It had to
be brought by the Broker, Wardley.
3. The Court states in its Opinion in paragraph 19, "Young claims she only became aware of
the parties' intentions to reduce the commission at the time of the closing on July 1, 1996. . . there
were no alleged facts in either affidavit that there were any communications among Young, Wardley

1. Young may have contributed to the Court's misconception that she didn't take any action, including
judicial action, to protect the commission at the time of closing because of a typographical error in her
Opening Brief on Appeal. Paragraph 4 of her Statement of Relevant Facts on page 5 of the brief states, "At the
time of closing, Young, on behalf of Wardley, refused the seller's demand to reduce the commission, but did
not take any action, including judicial action, to protect them by preventing the escrow agent from paying the
unpaid portion to the seller and the buyer." The sentence was intended to read: "At the time of closing, Young,
on behalf of Wardley, refused the seller's demand to reduce the commission, but Wardley did not take any
action, including judicial action, to protect them by preventing the escrow agent from paying the unpaid
portion to the seller and the buyer." In proof reading the final copy of the brief, that error was inadvertently
missed and Wardley's attorney ceased upon the omission in his response.
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and the seller prior to the final closing and commission disbursement to Wardley. . . Young also does
not allege that she notified Wardley of the sellers's intention to reduce the commissions or that she
requested that Wardley stop the closing."
A. It is clear from Young's affidavit that there were some discussions between her
and the buyer and letters to her from the buyer two weeks before the closing, demanding a
reduction in the purchase (sales) price (AR, pp 311-313 & Ex. K, AR, pp. 390-392). Young
averred that she discussed the matter with the seller's representative, Robert Highsmith, who
responded that the buyer had breached his agreement of confidentiality with him by contacting
the staff and the residents of the Chateau Brickyard Retirement Apartments and advising them
that he (the buyer) would be taking control of the apartments and would be raising the rents.
Highsmith informed Young that he (the seller) could not and would not reduce the sales price.
Young passed this information on to the buyer. Nothing more was mentioned to Young and
the sales price was never reduced.
B.

The seller faxed a letter and a revised HUD statement on June 28, 1996,

addressed to Scott Sims and Cindy Young, via Wardley Corp. Apparently Wardley received
the fax and did not advise Young of it or it's contents. Young did not see this fax and was not
aware of any intention to reduce the commission before she went to the closing with the buyer.
However, this is evidence that it was received in Wardley's office and that Wardley was aware
of it even before Young. Since Lynn Wardley produced it in his affidavit on behalf of Wardley
Corp., it is reasonable to believe it was seen by Kenneth Tramp, a principal of Wardley and the
branch broker, prior to the closing.

3

C.

In a letter to John K Mangum, Wardley5 s attorney, dated July 19, 1996,

Robert Holt, attorney for Associated Title, details conversations between Lyle Swenson, the
escrow closing officer, on July 1, the day of the buyer's closing, in which Swenson, Tramp and
Sims discussed, among other things, the June 28 fax and revised HUD. (ARpp. 397-399)
Whether or not the factual claims of that letter are true, it is obvious that Wardley had certain
knowledge of the intention of the seller and the buyer to reduce the commission before the
closing documents were signed by the buyer or the seller. Similarly, Dan Anderson of the law
firm of Fabian & Clendenin wrote an opinion letter to Young with a copy to Ken Tramp,
opining that Wardley had legitimate claims against Associated Title Company and the buyer,
Gary Taylor. (AR pp 375-76)
D. With regard to the statement that Young did not allege in her affidavit that she
had any communications with her broker, Wardley, about the attempts to change the
commission, she may have overlooked making a direct statement to that effect in her affidavit;
but in the deposition of Kenneth Tramp, attached to Young* s Response memorandum as
Exhibit A to Wardley's Motion For Summary Judgment, Tramp testified that he had
conversations with Young on the day of the buyer's closing, as well as with the buyer, the seller
and the escrow agent. (AR pp. 268-69). Moreover, notwithstanding Young did not directly
state that she had such communications with Wardley in her affidavit, there should be an
inference that she did. Who could possibly think that she didn't! Moreover, while not going
to this issue, Young confirms in her testimony at trial on November 15, 2005, that she did
have such communications with her broker Ken Tramp (AR p. 1394, pp. 147-151).
4

E.

Wardley received a fax from the seller dated June 28, 1996, three days before

the buyer's July 1, 1996 closing, in which the seller states that the sales commission is being
reduced to $150,000, along with a revised HUD showing such change. (Affidavit of Lynn
Wardley, Exhibit H, AR, pp, 177-179). Apparently Wardley received the fax, but did not
show it or communicate its existence to Young. This is further evidence that Wardley, even
before Young as its agent, knew on the date of the buyer's closing that the buyer and seller had
intentions of taking a portion of the commission for themselves.
4.

It appears clear from paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Court' s Opinion that the Court believes

that because Young asked the escrow agent not to record the deed (the transaction) until Wardley
received its full commission, that she was trying to stop or have Wardley stop the sale. This is a
misconception. Young was merely attempting to keep the escrow officer from dispersing funds from
the sale in the amount of the commission until Wardley could file an interpleader action with regard
to the full commission to which it and Young were entitled. The closing was not complete until the
seller, who was out of state, signed and returned the closing documents and the deed was recorded.
Wardley had more than ample time to consult with its attorneys and file an interpleader action.
Furthermore, an interpleader does not stop the sale by any means, but only secures the amount of the
full commission until the interpleader can be resolved, either voluntarily between the parties or at law.
An interpleader would have only prevented the seller and the buyer from absconding with the
commission.
5.

The Court states in paragraph 20, "Regarding its actions toward the buyer and title

company, Wardley concluded it would not pursue legal action, in part, because neither the buyer nor
5

the title company had entered into a contract with Wardley for the closing or the escrow on the
property." There is not a citation by Wardley to any evidence for that statement. The substantial
weight of the evidence is that Wardley did not pursue the title company for its own business reasons:
Kenneth Tramp, Wardley's principal and branch broker at the time, wrote a letter to Dan Anderson in
which he stated,
I am concerned about naming Associated Title Company in the complaint. We
do a lot of business with them, and the owner Bill Worthland [sic] a friend of Lynn and
myself If Cindy feels they have acted inappropriately I wish there was a way that
she could pursue her claims without having us be plaintiffs... (AR p. 378)
In his deposition, given on October 14, 2003, Kenneth Tramp testified that Wardley (we) made a
decision not pursue the title company for business reasons. (AR p. 649) If these statements are true,
Wardley did not sue Associated Title, and likely not the buyer, Gary Taylor, because of its own
business reasons and because of the friendship between Lynn Wardley, Kenneth Tramp and Bill
Worthland. Wardley clearly elevated its own self serving interests above the interests ofYoung's when
it had the responsibility to place her interest above its own under the principles of agency and under
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This gives rise to a genuine dispute as to why Wardley did
not do more to protect and collect the full commission at the time of the closing and why it did not
pursue its claims against the title company and the buyer after the closing. When viewed in a light most
favorable to Young, as opposed to Wardley, this should have precluded summary judgment. This issue
should have been tried on the evidence.
6.

The Court in paragraph 20 of its Opinion states, "After reviewing the record, we conclude

that Young did not offer evidence that Wardley5 s collection efforts were unreasonable." Young raised
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the issue that Wardley could have filed an interpleader action. Wardley is well aware of interpleader
actions. Wardley has been involved in a number of interpleader actions. Young submitted in evidence,
lettersfromWardley's attorney, John Mangum of the lawfirmof Nielsen and Senior, that Wardley had
causes of action against the buyer and the escrow agent and would bring such actions if Wardley was
unsuccessful in collecting from the seller. (AR pp.375-76). When the evidence is viewed in a light
most favorable to Young, this is ample evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Wardley's efforts at the time of closing and after were unreasonable and inadequate, thus precluding
summary judgment as to both a breach of contract and a breach ofWardley's implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
ISSUE OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION
This Court affirmed the decision of the trial court on the basis that the terms of the employment
contract between Wardley and Young relating to the payment of commissions were not ambiguous.
The Opinion states: "[T]he trial court's interpretation of the Agency Agreement is supported by at least
four provisions of the Agency Agreement. Paragraph 8 of the agency Agreement addresses Wardley's
payment of commissions to Young. It states that distribution of the earned commissions shall take
place as soon as practical after collection of such commissions from the party or parties for whom the
services have been performed." This provision says nothing about what course would be taken or what
would happen if the commission is not collected. So, does this mean that Young did not earn her
share of the commission that was not collected? That is what the trial court held. The trial court
stated, after quoting the same language of paragraph 8 of the Contract, "[H]ere, the term 'earned'
indicates that Ms. Young's commission calculation is based upon the actual amount that the property
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yielded and not on an assumed amount." The amount "collected " or ccyielded" has nothing to do with
the amount of commission she earned. If earned commission were limited to what the property yielded
or what Wardley collected, as the lower court ruled, there would have been no basis upon which
Wardley could have gone forward with a suit against the seller for the unpaid commissions. However,
Wardley did, in fact, pursue the seller for "earned" commission. Of course, had Wardley collected the
unpaid commission in its litigation against the seller, the property would have yielded the greater
amount. However, that does not deal with the circumstances that arise if the broker, or as here
Wardley, does not do its job. In that instance, Young's "earned" commission is not limited by what
the property yielded. The result is that Wardley simply does not pay Young all of the commission she
earned.
Further, in Young's appeal brief and her reply brief she cited Fairbourn Commercial Inc., v.
American Housing Partners, 68 P.3d 1038, 1042 (Utah App. 2003), whereas this Court considered
whether the term or phrase "due and payable at closing" created a condition precedent to Fairbourn's
entitlement to a commission or "whether it merely established the time when the commission was to
be paid, this court held that the phrase "due and payable at closing" did not create a condition
precedent to Fairbourn's entitlement to the commission. In Fairbourn the closing never took place,
but still, under the facts of that case, this Court held that the broker had produced a ready willing and
able buyer and was entitled to the commission earned under the listing contract. While Fairbourn is
a case between a broker and the seller of real estate and the instant case is between a broker, Wardley,
and its agent, Young, the principle of law is the same. Young is entitled to all the commission she
earned under the listing contract with the seller when read together with her employment contract or
8

agency agreement with Wardley. The fact that all of the commission was not collected does not
diminish her "earned" commission. The term "as soon as practical after collection", when read in
context, merely establishes the time when the commission is to be paid.2 This leaves the question of
whether Wardley did all it should have done to collect the commission. As set forth above, Young
claims it did not do all it should or could have, and that it failed to for its own business reasons which
it protected at Young's expense.
The Fairbourn holding that the phrase, "due and payable at closing" did not create a condition
precedent, and should also be applied to the instant case. The term "as soon as practical after
collection" in paragraph 8 of the Contract does not create a condition precedent to Young's being
entitled to her earned commission. It only provides a time when the commission should be paid. The
failure to collect all of the commission at closing only results in the rest of the commission being paid
later when it is collected. Of course, if it is never collected it may be that Young is never paid all of
the commission to which she earned. In this case, that raises a genuine dispute of a material fact that
precludes summary judgment and requires the trying of the issue at trial. The Fairbourn case also held
that the phrase "due on closing" did not condition the brokers receipt of commission on the buyer's

2. In fact, prior to this case Wardley was not so adamant about the application of the phrases "after
collection" and "total commission received by Wardley". Indeed, subsequent evidence at trial showed that
Wardley paid Scott Sims $40,000.on July 1,1996, which was before the closing was even complete and any
monies were received or collected by Wardley, and of which Young received nothing. (Defendant's Exhibit
9c, AR p, 1394, pp. 365 ) Other exhibits showed that Kenneth Tramp, Wardley's principal, had loaned Scott
Sims money which Sims listed in a bankruptcy filing in 1994. (AR 385-86) This gives a glimpse of what may
be an iceberg of facts underlying Wardley's reasons for not bringing an interpleader action which would have
delayed the payment of any of the commissions on the sale.
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performance, nor did the broker guarantee the buyers' performance. This Court in Fairbourn stated,
"the general rule is that absent a contractual provision which conditions the right to a commission on
the performance or part performance of the buyer, the broker is not an insurer of the subsequent
performance of the contract and is not deprived of his right to a commission by the failure or refusal
of one party to perform." (Idy citing Robert Langston, Ltd v. McQuarrrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557-58
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) That principle of law does not change just because this case is between a real
estate agent, Young, and her broker, Wardley. Young should not be deprived of her right to her
earned commission by the failure or refusal of the seller to perform.
The Court recites three other provisions in the Contract using the terms that payment will not
be made unless Wardley has collected or been paid the commission.

The "In House Commission

provision on page 4 of the Contract uses the term, "percent of the commission received" to explain the
percentage of the total commission which will be paid.

The use of the word received is a word

conveniently used to explain the percentages of the commission to which agents are entitled under
certain conditions. It in no way indicates a limitation on the commission earned by Young and to which
she is entitled.
Paragraph 9 of the Contract deals with commission disputes between agents who have
overlapping or conflicting claims. It provides the manner in which the commission, over and above the
brokers share, shall be divided among the participating sales executives or agents. It merely provides
that Wardley may hold the amount being disputed by the agents in trust to be divided pursuant to the
terms when resolved between the agents under that paragraph. It merely provides that Wardley shall
not be liable to agents for any of the disputed commission, "but when the commission shall have been
10

collected from the party or parties for whom the service was performed, Broker shall hold the same
in trust, to be divided according to the terms of this agreement " This provision applies to disputes
between agents and not disputes between agents and Wardley Further, it says nothing about only
paying commissions when they are collected, but states that when the commission is collected it shall
be held in trust by the Broker and divided among the disputing agents according to the terms of the
Contract This provision in no way limits the earned commission of Young, nor does it even hint that
Young is only entitled to be paid her commission if it is collected or received by Wardley
Paragraph 16 of the Contract is for an entirely different purpose and provides that an agent
terminated for any reason, voluntary or involuntary, shall not be entitled to any commission paid to
Wardley on projects that the agent worked on after the agent has left her or his association with
Wardley It is a penalty for leaving and is not applicable in any way to the payment of commissions
to agents while they are still employed by Wardley
The Utah Supreme Court held in Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 560 P. 2<i 13 83 1385
(1977) that a party may not by its own voluntary act or by negligence, place the right to compensation
beyond its reach and avoid liability to another for the compensation The Supreme Court held there is
an implied obligation on the part of the Promisor to exercise reasonable diligence to collect the money
hi Reed v. Union Cent Lifelnsur., Co. of Cincinnati, 61 Utah 21, 321 Utah 295 (1900) the Court
held that a company having placed beyond its power, the right to collect premium notes was estopped
from denying liability for insurance commissions earned upon the ground that the makers of the notes
was insolvent and the notes were uncollectible The Court in that case also held that a waiver of a
known right must be intentional

Young has not relinquished or waived her rights to the unpaid
11

commission that she earned
There is no express provision in the Contract which would alert Young that she will not be paid
her commission if Wardley should decide not to collect it The effect of the Court's Opinion is to
rewrite the Contract and supply a term or terms which Wardely omitted, which the Utah Supreme
Court has said it will not do Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P 2d P 2d 743, 749 (Utah
1982) Wardley, who drafted the Contract, may argue that it is clear to it that the terms of the Contract
are not ambiguous Those terms are not so clear as to have advised Young when she entered into the
contract that she would not be paid all of her earned commission if Wardley chose not to collect it
Young's interpretation is not specious or unreasonable The contract is ambiguous in that it is not
clear and is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation Ward v. Intermountain Farmers
Association, 907 P 2d 264 (Utah 1995), Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P 2d 923, 928 (Utah Ct App 1998)
(reversed on other grounds) holding that a contract (or decree) is ambiguous where the words used
may be understood to support two or more plausible meanings This Court should reconsider and
reverse its decision and remand the case to the trial court to take extrinsic evidence of the parties
intentions upon entering into the Contract
UTAH STATUTORY SCHEME
It does not appear that the Court's opinion gave any consideration to the statutory scheme
regulating the relationship between real estate brokers and agents The duty of Wardley to Young is
enhanced by the statutory scheme of Utah real estate law and in particular UCA § 78-61-18, which
provides that no one may sue to collect a commission except the principal broker involved in the
transaction An agent cannot bring an action to enforce his or her rights to a commission except
12

against the principal broker. For this reason the Supreme Court has held that the contractual
relationship between a broker and a real estate agent is that of an employer - employee, rather than one
of independent contractor. Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009, 458 Utah
Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah 2002); Whitev.Fox, 665 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 1983); Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp.y666
P.2d 876, 881 (Utah 1983)
There is a substantial question of fact as to whether Wardley knowingly placed the collection
of the full commission beyond its reach at the time of closing and its reasons for so doing, as well as
the reasonableness of its actions to collect the commission after the closing. In reviewing the summary
judgment granted by the trial court, all evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn must
be reviewed in a light most favorable to Young as the opposing party. Brockbank v. Brockbank, 2001
UTApp 25l1f 10, 33P.3d990.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above there are genuine disputes as to issues of material fact concerning
whether Wardley's actions in failing to preserve the full commission at closing and in failing to pursue
litigation against the buyer and the title company after closing were reasonable. In light of some
misconceptions of facts recited by the Court in its Opinion and conflicts of some of the facts with the
evidence, Young respectfully urges the Court to grant her Petition for Rehearing in this matter.
Dated t h i s ^ ^ a y of April, 2008.
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